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ABSTRACT 
 
Macroeconomics is political. The very variables used in macroeconomic models – 
unemployment, inflation, interest rates – are frequently heard in political debate. The work of 
macroeconomists underlies these discussions as it mingles in contested political narratives. In 
this paper I present the findings of a research project studying macroeconomists working on 
the relationship between unemployment and inflation between the 1960s and early 1980s. 
Central to the paper is the macroeconomists own political beliefs and how they shape their 
economic modelling. A minority saw no relationship between their macroeconomic work and 
their political beliefs. Yet many others did identify exactly that; often seeing their academic 
work as a political activity. The fascination here is in the contingency of these connections; 
how each individual negotiates the complexity and ambiguity of the political connotations of 
their own work. I develop the concept of Political Interpretative Flexibility to aid our 
understanding of how macroeconomists can (a) espouse similar theories yet inscribe radically 
different political connotations, and (b) promote similar political agendas through radically 
different economic theories. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper uses the example of debates about the introduction of Adaptive and Rational 
expectations Augmented Phillips Curves in the 1970s and 1980s to explore the relationship 
between macroeconomic ideas and the political connotations associated with them by 
macroeconomists. The analysis is drawn from a wider project studying the development of 
the Phillips Curve debate conducted from a Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
perspective ( Stephens 2005, 2007). The paper is in four sections. The first describes the 
central theoretical development of the paper: Political Interpretative Flexibility. The second 
briefly introduces the concept of the Phillips Curve so the reader can follow the paper while 
avoiding an excessive description of abstract economics. This is followed by the longest 
section of the paper that uses interview data with macroeconomists to empirically 
demonstrate Political Interpretative Flexibility. The final section provides some conclusions 
on the empirical work and offers some theoretical implications for changes in 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. 
 
1. POLITICAL INTERPRETATIVE FLEXIBILITY AND THE SOCIAL INTEREST 
MODEL 
 
The classic model for a social interests explanation in the STS literature is Steve Shapin’s 
(1975, 1979) account of 18th Century Phrenology in Edinburgh. Shapin argues the shifting 
nature of Scottish society produced a political culture that was both shaped and reinforced by 
the debates concerning the acceptance of Phrenology as a scientific practice. To the newly 
established bourgeoisie the Phrenological claim that differences in the physical construction 
of people’s brains led to diversity in people’s skills and character lent scientific legitimacy to 
their political interest in promoting the emergent division of labour. Conversely groups keen 
to promote traditional social hierarchies in Scotland saw their values expressed through the 
old Scottish Common-Sense philosophical explanation of the mind, and invested resources in 
sustaining the field. 
 
This paper argues that a social interest explanation cannot account for the experience of 
debates about the Phillips Curve because the political significance of the various formulations 
are subject to Interpretative Flexibility. The paper draws upon a set of interviews conducted 
with macroeconomists engaged in the Phillips Curve debate to demonstrate the dynamics that 
allow this to be the case, and then explores the implications for macroeconomic debate. 
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Political Interpretative Flexibility does not mean that macroeconomic theories are apolitical. 
The empirical section of this paper will show that many macroeconomists believe their 
political goals were expressed through the version of the Phillips Curve they supported, and 
saw the promotion of that Phillips Curve as a political activity. Instead Political Interpretative 
Flexibility means that a single scientific notion has flexibility in the political goals it 
embodies. Subsequently, in the case of the Phillips Curve debate, we find two implications. 
Firstly each version of the Phillips Curve is used to express multiple political ideologies. 
Secondly macroeconomists with the same political background adopt opposing constructions 
of the Phillips Curve to represent their social interests. In effect the various formulations of 
the Phillips Curve are not apolitical but any-political. 
 
For macroeconomists the exact relationship between political ideas and macroeconomic ideas 
is complex, heterogeneous, and contingent. Some macroeconomists do not perceive any 
political connotation to their work. Others claim no political allegiances in or out of 
macroeconomics. Yet others identify clear political interests in their work. Of these a further 
subset assert that their support for a particular form of expectations augmented Phillips Curve 
is a deliberately ideologically motivated act. These positions will be demonstrated 
empirically shortly. For now the vital insight is that the pattern of linkages between political 
ideology and Phillips Curve augmentation is not systematic. Despite the existence of 
ideologically motivated participants in the debate, there is no consistent association between 
any version of the Phillips Curve and sets of social interests. Since a systematic link is 
missing, shifts in the wider political power struggle do not produce analogous changes in 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. Social interest theories of the sort so fruitfully employed in the 
characterisation of Phrenology in 18th Century Edinburgh fail to provide equivalently 
insightful accounts of mid 20th Century Anglo-American macroeconomics. 
 
THE PHILLIPS CURVE 
 
The term Phillips Curve is used in macroeconomics used to describe a range of theories about 
the relationship between unemployment and inflation. Between the late 1950s and the early 
1980s three versions of the Phillips Curve became widely adopted by the profession only to 
loose popularity and be replaced by another conception. For the purposes of this paper, the 
three versions of the Phillips Curve will be referred to as the Original Phillips Curve, the 
Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve, and the Rational Expectations Phillips Curve1. The 
                                                 
1 The various curves are referred to by a wide variety of names by macroeconomists themselves. The first curve, 
here the Original Phillips Curve, is frequently referred to as simply the Phillips Curve, the Phillips Curve or 
Phillips’ Phillips Curve. The second curve, here the Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve, is more often 
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Wage 
Inflation 
Unemployment 
The Original Phillips Curve 
Original Phillips Curve, developed by Bill Phillips (1958) and Richard Lipsey (1960), 
suggests an inverse non-linear relationship between inflation and unemployment as shown in 
fig. 1. One implication often associated with this version is that a government can lower 
unemployment by injecting money into the economy to create jobs: as workers would be 
willing to work at new higher levels of wages. However this would result in increased 
inflation. 
 
 
Fig 1. The Original Phillips Curve 
 
 
The second version, the Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve, was developed by Milton 
Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1967). Here the Phillips Curve is assumed to hold as 
Phillips and Lipsey argue in the short run. However in the long run the relationship breaks 
down and the curve becomes a vertical line, as shown in fig. 2. This is because, to continue 
the example above, after workers had been attracted to work because of the increased wages 
they would come to realise that the wages had only raised in nominal terms, i.e. the physical 
number of currency they receive has increased, but the actual spending power gains are an 
illusion because prices have also risen due to inflation. Subsequently the workers 
expectations of the changes in the price level gradually become realistic and they leave their 
jobs and the unemployment rate returns to the original position on the long run vertical 
Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve. This learning process is termed adaptive expectations. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
referred to as the Natural Rate of Unemployment or NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment), although is also know as the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve, the Monetarist 
Phillips Curve, the vertical long-run Phillips Curve, or even simply the Phillips Curve. The third curve, here the 
Rational Expectations Phillips Curve, is sometimes known as the Rational Expectations Augmented Phillips 
Curve, the New Classical Synthesis Phillips Curve, or again simply the Phillips Curve. 
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Fig 2. A Basic Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve 
 
 
The third version, the Rational Expectations Phillips Curve, does not use adaptive 
expectations, which work with a time lag. Instead it asserts that economic agents base their 
expectations of future price changes on all the available information and will, on average, 
have correct expectations of the future in all but a few instances. Consequently people are 
never ‘fooled’ into believing their wages are anything other than what they realistically will 
be, and thus the short-run period in the Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve – where the 
Original Phillips Curve is still deemed effective – never occurs. Thus in fig. 3 the Rational 
Expectations Phillips Curve is always found in the long run position. 
 
 
Fig 3. A Basic Rational Expectations Phillips Curve 
 
 
 
 
 
As we will see, the political connotations of each of these Phillips Curves is contingent and 
locally negotiated due to Political Interpretative Flexibility. 
 
Wage 
Inflation 
The Rational Expectations Phillips 
Curve
Wage 
Inflation 
Unemployment 
The Short Run Adaptive Expectations 
Phillips Curve
The Long Run Adaptive Expectations 
Phillips Curve
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3. POLITICAL INTERPRETATIVE FLEXIBILITY IN MACROECONOMICS 
 
Claims of Apolitical Macroeconomics 
 
As stated above, some macroeconomists expressed political neutrality for either their theories 
or their personal beliefs. An example is Peter Stoney; an economist who during the 1970s 
was based at the University of Liverpool and published two contributions to the Phillips 
Curve debate with Leighton Thomas. The first a critique of Bertie Hines’ Trade Union 
militancy argument (Hines, 1964, 1968, 1969, 1971), the second exploring the role of 
unemployment dispersion (Thomas & Stoney 1970, 1972): 
 
 
Interviewer: “How would you characterise your political position in the early 70s, late 
60s, when [your Phillips Curve] papers were being published?” 
 
Peter Stoney: “Inchoate, undeveloped, not clear, it’s only recently through the last 
fifteen, twenty years that I’ve become more clear about that kind of issue, yeah, didn’t 
really have any political definition, clear definition, in my mind if that’s what you’re 
asking” 
 
 
And secondly Dale Mortensen, an early advocate of the microfoundations of the Adaptive 
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve literature, and also later advocated the Rational 
Expectations Phillips Curve. Mortensen published a contribution to Edmund Phelps’ seminal 
Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory (Mortensen 1970): 
 
 
Interviewer: “Do you think the political impact of [your work on the Phillips Curve] is 
obvious, or is it ambiguous in terms of policy choices?” 
 
Dale Mortensen: “In terms of policy choices, well no it’s probably somewhat 
ambiguous, it depends on how you look at it, the idea of a vertical Phillips Curve does 
not imply that there isn’t room for short run counter-cyclic policy and the costs and 
benefits of that policy” 
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And elsewhere in the interview: 
 
 
Dale Mortensen: “Frankly I was more interested in making a name for myself, ha ha, 
and the political impacts of the work weren’t the first order of consideration” 
 
 
We can see that some macroeconomists perceived no clear political connotation of their work 
and no political motivation to their actions. We now turn to the more engaging demonstration 
of the Political Interpretative Flexibility of the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips 
Curve. 
 
 
Political Interpretative Flexibility in the Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve 
 
 
We begin with a quotation from David Laidler on ideological motivations in the Phillips 
Curve debate. Laidler moved to Manchester University in 1969 where he was awarded a 
grant with Michael Parkin to establish the Manchester Inflation Workshop. During this period 
Laidler made frequent and influential contributions to theorising the Adaptive Expectations 
Augmented Phillips Curve (Laidler 1971, 1972, 1975, 1976, Parkin and Laidler 19752 Laidler 
and Purdy 1974). Here he is discussing an exchange between himself and Joan Robinson, one 
of a number of Cambridge economists famous for their staunchly left wing and Keynesian 
views (Turner 1989, King 1998): 
 
 
Interviewer: “Do you think that there were people who were trying to express directly 
political views, and were making theories and using data in such a way that supported 
political opinion?” 
 
David Laidler: “Oh what a good question. I suppose the answer is yes and no … when 
you are concerned with economic policy and someone comes up with a position you 
                                                 
2 This paper is a review article of the previous Phillips Curve literature. Although it offers no unique empirical 
work of its own, the paper made an important contribution to framing and subsequently closing the debate about 
Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curves. For a parallel example on the Post-Keynsians and the 1960s 
capital controversies, see Mata (2004). 
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don’t agree with, and seems to leave out evidence that you think is absolutely critical, 
the first reaction is usually to think that this is an ideologically motivated piece of 
work that was being written for ulterior motives, I mean I think that’s just human 
nature to react that way, but I’ve been treated that way by other people often enough 
ha ha” 
 
Interviewer: “You mean people assume your work is ideologically motivated?” 
 
David Laidler: “See my work in exactly that way… if you turn to the proceedings of 
the 1972 BAAS conference, which was edited by Joan Robinson, … you’ll find she 
goes out of her way to be extremely nasty and hang ideological motives around my 
neck in her editor’s introduction” 
 
Interviewer: “She was accusing you of ideologically motivated work?” 
 
David Laidler: “Yeah, and I’m sure I was accusing Joan of that as well, ha ha, no 
question about it” 
 
Interviewer: “Do you think that what you were doing was ideologically motivated 
work?” 
 
David Laidler: “Well you can look at the paper … no I didn’t think so” 
 
 
Laidler locates macroeconomic debate in a politically motivated discourse, but declines to 
implicate his own involvement. This reminds us that even in the context of Political 
Interpretative Flexibility macroeconomics is also pervaded with the norms of value 
neutrality3. 
 
We continue with a discussion by Laurence Copeland, a macroeconomist working at the 
Manchester School Inflation Workshop headed by Michael Parkin and David Laidler. 
Copeland identifies himself as right wing. Here Copeland reflects upon his publication 
criticising a paper by John Eatwell, John Llewellyn and Roger Tarling (1974) about the Key 
Industry Hypothesis (Copeland 1977). Their paper supported the use of the Key Industry 
                                                 
3 For more on value neutrality in macroeconomics see Morgan and Rutherford (1998) and  Stephens (2005). 
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variable as a superior explanatory variable to unemployment on the horizontal axis of a 
standard Phillips Curve without expectations augmentation: 
 
Laurence Copeland: “There was a political background to this in the sense Eatwell, 
Llewellyn & Tarling were, you know, lefties, don't ask me how lefty or the what the 
theology of the left was or where they fitted on that spectrum in those days, but they 
were certainly left wing and that went, this Trade Union leadership and all the rest of 
it, went with a broadly sort of anti-market attitude. We didn't see it in those terms but 
they saw it in terms of this sort of right versus left, business market verse anti-market” 
 
Interviewer: “Do you think that that came through very strongly in their paper?” 
 
Laurence Copeland: “…you must remember that it wouldn't have to, because 
everybody knew who was working in the area, even those who were not working in 
the area, even the bloody politicians and all the rest of it were aware of the fact that 
there was cost push and demand pull, and the conventional wisdom in those days was 
all cost push. I mean you ask the bloke in the street he'd say cost push, he wouldn't use 
those terms but he'd describe it in those terms, everybody was cost push it was only us 
weirdoes at Manchester who were right in both senses of the word” 
 
 
Here Copeland's account identifies a strict political distinction between the left and the right, 
and associates these groups with positions in the Phillips Curve debate. Copeland also 
describes the distinction as being very explicit and public. We continue the discussion with 
reference to the political make-up of the Manchester University Economics Department, 
where the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve promoting group of which 
Copeland was a member came to be called the Manchester School, or the Inflation 
Workshop: 
 
 
Interviewer: “There were left wing thinkers at Manchester though?” 
 
Laurence Copeland: “Oh Christ that's what I said, I mean within the department we 
knew we were unorthodox, the department was, you could divide the department into 
three, not two, the department was in three segments and you could go round the 
department, it was like when I was a kid at school you knew who was a [Manchester] 
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City supporter and who was a [Manchester] United supporter. It was exactly like that, 
everybody was one of those three groups. I could have gone through the whole bloody 
lot right down to RAs and PhD students the whole lot. You were always one of three 
groups. There were the Marxists, who no doubt saw themselves as being variegated, 
you know Trotskyites and Neo-Ricarians, bloody Maoists and shit knows you know, 
but basically Marxists, and then there was a central group of old fashioned Keynesians 
and then there was the group around the inflation workshop, the Manchester School” 
 
 
Copeland's account continues to construct strict linkages between Key Industry and Trade 
Union power oriented Phillips Curves and the left and the Manchester Schools Adaptive 
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve advocacy and the right. However, as the interview 
probes deeper Copeland begins to question the boundaries he had previously been describing 
through a discussion of George Zis and David Purdy, two Manchester colleges who shared 
his views on the Phillips Curve (Purdy and Zis 1974a, 1974b Ward and Zis 1974):  
 
 
Laurence Copeland: “Well George Zis is a Marxist, George is a Marxist who let’s say 
is one of a group of several Marxists I know in the British profession who are let’s say 
flexible” 
 
Interviewer: “OK” 
 
Laurence Copeland: “Now don't ask me how they square it with what they do, that's 
not my affair, you know, a man’s religion is his own affair, but em, that was a fact. So 
George worked both sides of the park, I mean, you see George is not quantitative, ... 
George is alright, but as I say how he squares it with his Marxism. He did a paper with 
David Purdy and it was published in the Manchester School [of Economic and Social 
Studies] I think, remember this, that when it comes to subjects like the influence of 
Trade Unions on inflation, the left was ambiguous, for some purposes they wanted to 
make it cost push, for some purposes they didn't, now don't ask me how they square 
that with this and all the rest of it” 
 
 
And from George Zis himself: 
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George Zis: “Myself and [David] Purdy were well to the left of the labour party, I 
mean I have always personally identified with Greek Communism so in that sense I 
never espoused reliance on the market mechanism, but again this so called Keynesian 
analysis of inflation intellectually looked very, very weak” 
 
 
Copeland’s initial account of steadfast linkages between political interests and 
macroeconomic theories is amongst the most stringent of its type in the data collected. 
Despite this he still introduces ambiguities into the relationship. By identifying Marxists who 
support the Adaptive Expectations Phillips Curve, Copeland also provides a striking contrary 
position to the leftist construction of Joan Robinson and the Cambridge macroeconomists 
offered by David Laidler. Copeland never questions the ties between the right and 
monetarism, but does identify distinctions within left wing political interpretations. 
 
These differences are in the political connotation of what Copeland terms cost push inflation. 
Cost push explanations of inflation stipulate that inflation is a product of passed on increases 
in production costs, usually wage costs through Trade Union influence. The Political 
Interpretative Flexibility for the left wing is in attaching a positive or negative judgement to 
Trade Union influence causing inflation. A positive left wing interpretation of accepting a 
cost push explanation is the implication that Trade Unions work well in representing 
workers’ pay and conditions. Furthermore, for those cost push advocates who go so far as to 
exclude unemployment as an explanatory variable altogether, the theory suggests an 
impotency for incomes polices in controlling inflation, which means workers’ wages will not 
be systematically repressed. However, on the negative side the argument that Trade Unions 
cause inflation negates the benefit of wage rises and could lead to calls for a reduction of 
Trade Union power. 
 
The analytical insight here is not that all left wing thinkers were in continual paradox over 
these concerns. Neither is the argument that cost push inflation is politically neutral for the 
left. Indeed for many it may be obvious to each individual thinker whether advocating cost 
push is politically advantageous or disadvantageous. Several sources have confirmed that 
Bertie Hines, a left winger well known as an advocate of the Trade Union militancy variable, 
considered the cost push explanation an embodiment of his political ideology (Hines 1964, 
1968, 1969, 1971). Two public challengers of Hines were George Zis and David Purdy, the 
left wingers Copeland acknowledges muddy his tightly drawn connections between politics 
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and macroeconomics and were avid critics of Hine’s cost push explanations (Purdy and Zis 
1974a, 1974b). 
 
Let us return to the constructions of the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve as 
right wing. Here is a quotation from left winger Richard Lipsey, who during his time at the 
London School of Economics between 1955 and 1963, worked with Bill Phillips and others 
at the Measurement and Methodology Seminar group on a seminal early contribution to the 
Phillips Curve debate (Lipsey 1960, Lipsey and Steuer 1961)4. When asked if the Adaptive 
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve had an obvious political connotation, Lipsey 
responded: 
 
 
Richard Lipsey: “Oh yeah, yeah, I mean it was basically anti any form of stabilisation 
policy, whether monetary or fiscal, it said that monetary policy should be directed at 
the price level and the macro unemployment should just be left to the market, very 
strong political implications about macro economic policy” 
 
Interviewer: “Towards the right you’re saying?” 
 
Richard Lipsey: “Well I guess you’d call that the right, yeah. But I don’t have any 
problem saying monetary policy should be relatively concerned with the price level, 
but I am for saying fiscal policy is a pretty blunt instrument, from which I say we must 
learn to do better at macro policy, and they say we shouldn’t have any macro policy, 
but I think it was very cogent, we learned from it, but it definitely had political 
implications which are in a loose sense right wing anti-interventionist in terms of 
macroeconomic policy” 
 
Interviewer: “And small government?” 
 
Richard Lipsey: “Yeah” 
 
 
Lipsey’s account identifies a clear political interpretation for the Adaptive Expectations 
Augmented Phillips Curve. He couches it as an expression of anti-interventionist ideology. 
He associates this with right wing thought, while introducing locations of agreement with his 
                                                 
4 For more on the Measurement and Methodology Seminar group, see De Marchi (1988). 
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own position and a reconfiguration of the interpretation that increases the congruence with 
leftist political ideology. 
 
The most famous advocate of the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve as a 
politically right wing phenomenon is Milton Friedman (1962, 1968, 1975, 1977, 1980). 
Claims such as “[i]nflation is a disease, a dangerous and sometimes fatal disease, a disease 
that if not checked in time can destroy a society” (Friedman 1980 p289) and his preference 
for small government solutions led Friedman to use the Adaptive Expectations Augmented 
Phillips Curve as a justification for using supply-management policies including reductions in 
social security provision, privatisation of industry and curtailing Trade Union power5. These 
policies are in this context typically associated with right wing thought. 
 
In the following quotation, Friedman provides an engaging exploration of the links between 
macroeconomic ideas and political connotations. He both acknowledges the existence of 
these typical and expected relationships between macroeconomic schools and political 
opinions while offering examples of counter cases. He then offers an articulation of how he 
could embody his own political goals through a Keynesian economic theory:  
 
 
Milton Friedman: “We can find any number of cases in which people hold what seem 
like wholly incompatible political and scientific positions. There are people who 
profess to be Keynesians in the United States who are explaining how surpluses offset 
recessions” 
 
Interviewer: “Incompatible in what way?” 
 
Milton Friedman: “Well in the United States you have the Democrats today [February 
2002] who are trying to blame [George W.] Bush for the economy going into a 
deficit, and they are essentially arguing that surpluses are stimulating, which of 
course is the opposite of the basic Keynesian view” 
 
Interviewer: “So by saying that that is incompatible you are making an association 
between Keynesianism and the left, the Democrats?” 
 
                                                 
5 These policies were pursued by Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK during the 1980s. 
For a discussion of this, see Bateman (2002), Backhouse (2002), Green (1999) Maynard (1988). 
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Milton Friedman: “That has been the relation in the United States, yes” 
 
Interviewer: “Do you think that's inevitable?” 
 
Milton Friedman: “Don't misunderstand me, the left is Keynesian but not all 
Keynesians are left … there are some on the left who are Marxian … but certainly the 
policies of the left have largely been Keynesian” 
 
 
Friedman continues: 
 
 
Milton Friedman: “But let me emphasis; a right wing person could use Keynesianism 
as well. The left has been largely interested in having a big government and the 
notion that the way to solve problems of depression and recession is by spending 
government money - the way to make government big. But as someone as myself 
who would prefer to see government small rather than big, if I thought Keynesian 
notions were right, I could use them as well. Instead of recommending government 
spending you would recommend tax cuts, and during booms instead of 
recommending higher taxes you would recommend lower spending. So the same 
theory can be used for different political purposes” 
 
 
Friedman articulates several of the tenants of Political Interpretative Flexibility, while 
acknowledging a prevailing wisdom about political affiliations; and expressing surprise that 
that this wisdom does not always hold. The later part of the quotation states how Friedman 
would pursue his right wing political goals through a Keynesian framework. This is a central 
component of Political Interpretative Flexibility: the potential for expressing the same 
political goals through differing theoretical frameworks. For a demonstration of the 
remaining central component of Political Interpretative Flexibility - the potential for the same 
theoretical framework to express differing political goals – we will contrast Friedman’s 
position with that of Edmund Phelps. 
 
Phelps’ first work on the Phillips Curve was his PhD dissertation, supervised by James Tobin 
at Yale, that supported the original Phillips Curve (Phelps 1961). After eight years at Yale, 
and the Cowles Foundation, Phelps moved to University of Pennsylvania for five years and 
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then to Columbia University where he remains today. During the mid 1960s Phelps’ work 
on the introduction of expectations to the Phillips Curve created a foundational basis for the 
Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve (Phelps 1967, 1970). On this, Dale 
Mortensen: 
 
 
Interviewer: “Were you aware of any writers that you felt were doing politically 
motivated work?” 
 
Dale Mortensen: “I think probably Phelps was” 
 
Interviewer: “How?” 
 
Dale Mortensen: “Motivated by it, he felt more than others that … the policy makers 
were not taking into account the potential for future inflation in what they were doing, 
the potential consequences” 
 
Interviewer: “OK, so sort of reins the importance of future inflation within the 
political agenda” 
 
Dale Mortensen: “Right” 
 
Interviewer: “Would you say that that would cling to a specific party political 
position?” 
 
Dale Mortensen: “Not necessarily, it was more within the policy debate generally, it 
wasn’t democratic or republican” 
 
 
Mortensen claims a non-party political basis for Phelps’ political motivation. However he 
does acknowledge a political motivation in the work. The ideological origins of Phelps’ 
research are better revealed in his own reflections on the issue: 
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Edmund Phelps: “I would be a living example of somebody who arrived at a theoretical 
perspective that has a lot of kinship with Milton Friedman, but on a whole range of 
policy things I don’t agree with Milton Friedman …” 
 
Interviewer: “How would you characterise your political position [in the Nineteen 
Seventies] briefly?” 
 
Edmund Phelps: “Oh, probably just a mainstream Keynesian, a mainstream Democrat, 
I mean I still believed in using anti-cyclical tools of the government to fight recessions 
and to fight unsustainable booms and I was relatively moderate on the inflation side … 
I had the activism of Keynesians, I still retain the activism of Keynesians” 
 
 
In the following quote Phelps is discussing the taxation implications of running supply side 
policies. By negative income taxation, he is referring to income subsidies paid to those living 
below the poverty line. This quotation is particularly interesting because Phelps alludes to the 
Interpretative Flexibility of the notions he believes in while accounting for them. 
 
 
Edmund Phelps: “I favoured a negative income tax when I was a young, very young 
economist myself but then later on I felt well wait a minute, why should we just splash 
this money on people independently of whether they work? Why don’t we, I know 
you may say this is a more conservative idea, and it is and it isn’t, wouldn’t it be much 
better if instead we paid subsidies to employers to employ low wage people to pull up 
their wage rates and to pull up their employment? And then they would be self 
supporting and they would be more fulfilled individuals and they’d be happy and 
productive and it would be a revolutionary change” 
 
 
By doing this Phelps is suggesting the use of supply side policies to lower unemployment. 
This is akin to investment to create high levels of aggregate demand as seen in many 
Keynesian schemes. To Phelps the negative income tax is a means of providing the 
unemployed with jobs beyond those created by the free market. Here Phelps is constructing 
supply side policies in such a way that they are expressive of his left wing political 
orientation. There is another way in which Phelps does this: 
 
 18
 
Edmund Phelps: “I wrote a book in which I said, ‘look four percent inflation per year 
is not so bad, and there might be certain things to recommend it’ ” 
 
 
As we know, the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve suggests that any attempt 
to reduce unemployment below the natural rate will result in ever increasing inflation. By 
constructing an account in which inflation is not necessary an unquestionable negative event 
for an economy he negates the assumption present in right wing accounts of the Adaptive 
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve that unemployment must not be tackled through 
stimulating demand because it risks inflation. For Phelps reducing unemployment does not 
cause a negative effect. It will cause inflation, but inflation is no longer deemed unbearable 
so-long as it remains a stable low level inflation. Thus the Adaptive Expectations Augmented 
Phillips Curve remains compatible with the welfare state and the other state apparatuses 
attacked as inflationary in right wing variants of the relationship. 
 
Let us conclude the section on the Political Interpretative Flexibility of the Adaptive 
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve. We have had accounts of macroeconomists 
providing politically motivated work from Laidler, Copeland and Lipsey. We have seen a 
standard right wing construction of the Adaptive Expectations Augmented scheme, typified 
by Milton Friedman, and seen Friedman’s articulation of how a Keynesian framework can be 
used to embody right wing political interests. Then, in contrast to this, we have seen Phelps’ 
articulation of a left wing construction of the adaptive scheme. We have also had accounts in 
and around the Manchester Inflation workshop of economists associating themselves with 
forms of Marxism and the far left, some of whom act very aggressively towards the Adaptive 
Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve, and others who support it. We will now see that 
these multiple usages of economic theory are also present with the Rational Expectations 
Augmented Phillips Curve. 
 
 
Political Interpretative Flexibility in the Rational Expectations Phillips Curve 
 
The leading proponents of rational expectations in both the US and UK are well known for 
their right wing positions, Robert E Lucas and Patrick Minford (Lucas 1972, 1973, 1975; 
Lucas and Rapping 1969a 1969b; Minford 1980, 1981, 1986). In the right wing mould the 
vertical, or nearly vertical, Rational Expectations Augmented Phillips Curve offers a very 
 19
similar policy interpretation as the Adaptive Expectations Augemented Phillips Curve 
(Friedman 1975). However, as Political Interpretative Flexibility predicts, this does not mean 
all rational expectations advocates are right wing. On Lucas and his sometimes co-author 
Thomas Sargent (Lucas & Sargent 1979, 1981), rational expectations convert Dale 
Mortensen says: 
 
 
Dale Mortensen: “I mean you can go through it, there are no two people more 
politically different than each other than Bob Lucas and Tom Sargent, their politics are 
90 degrees to each other, but their methods as researchers are similar” 
 
 
Just as in the U.S., where frequent rational expectations co-authors Lucas and Sargent were 
political opposites, in the U.K. the prominent research team of Minford and David Peel, both 
at the time based at Liverpool University – and the ‘Liverpool School’ – also experienced far 
reaching political differences (Minford and Peel 1980, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1983). In this 
lengthy articulation of the issues at hand, Peel provides an account of the political 
connotation of the Rational Expectations Phillips Curve, firstly as right wing, then as 
apolitical, and finally his own position as expressive of left wing ideology. Responding to 
whether the relationship had an obvious political implication, Peel revealed: 
 
 
David Peel: “Well I suppose this one did, that's why it was so challenged. Maybe it 
was put in that form because the proponents of it wanted it to be taken that way … 
Everything got rolled together so a word like Monetarist became a dirty word to some. 
… I would have thought of myself as a Monetarist in that I believed in a vertical 
Phillips Curve, certainly in the long run, but for instance I thought of myself as a 
socialist, so my views on defence expenditure, health or whatever, taxes, were totally 
irrelevant to that position. But I think a lot of people thought that if you took up a 
position on rational expectations it implied that you were somehow a right winger and 
pushing a certain view, but those things are never logically related” 
 
 
We continue: 
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Interviewer: “So to make it clear you're saying that it's completely sensible and not 
incompatible for you to be a socialist and believe in rational expectations” 
 
David Peel: “Not at all, not at all” 
 
Interviewer: “That's what you're saying or you don't think it's a contradiction?” 
 
David Peel: “Not a contradiction at all … it's simply a proposition about money stock 
and inflation, there's nothing to say per se about your views on health or what the 
appropriate ratio of government expenditure to income are, it's simply a proposition 
about control of inflation” 
 
 
Peel's acknowledges a public perception of connections between the Rational Expectations 
Phillips Curve and the right. He asserts his disagreement with the claim through a discourse 
of objectivity. However as the interview continues he is willing to reinstate political 
connotations for the relationship: 
 
 
Interviewer: “OK, so you've said you don't feel there's any link between rational 
expectations and a political position, do you think…” 
 
David Peel: “Well there needn't be, there have been people who have clearly been 
associated with rational expectations who've been very political, Patrick Minford is an 
example, there are many others” 
 
Interviewer: “And have you seen, say, the Friedman style Phillips Curve or even the 
original Phillips Curve, do you think there have been political advocates that have 
been using these for their positions as well?” 
 
David Peel: “Well it's, ha ha ha, funnily enough you see if properly interpreted even 
the zero trade-off idea, which caused a lot of problems … actually from a left wing 
perspective could have been taken on board and used much more effectively, because 
essentially what it was saying [was] there was no long run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment, Now remember what economists of a so called middle ground or 
left wing persuasion were saying, remember what policy advice was based on that. It 
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was, to quote Frank Page, that we need to keep a pool of unemployment to moderate 
inflation, having a long run trade-off implies you can only keep inflation down by 
maintaining unemployment at a high enough rate to keep it down. What the zero 
trade-off position is saying, particularly under [Rational Expectations], is that there's 
essentially no meaningful trade off, so you don't need to keep pools of unemployment 
to keep inflation down, what it’s saying is that if you want to reduce unemployment 
you don't do it by inflating, you do it by having active labour market policies that bear 
on real factors such as mobility of labour, housing, unemployment benefits, retraining, 
the whole cacophony of policies that make the labour market function more smoothly, 
but you can't just fix it by simply inflating or having a pool of unemployment. Now 
you know if having a pool of unemployment is a good left wing idea then I wouldn't 
particularly want to be associated with it” 
 
 
Peel’s account identifies clear left wing connotations for the Rational Expectations Phillips 
Curve. The promise of eradicating pools of unemployment provides expression for the leftist 
political goal of full employment. As with the Adaptive Expectations Augmented Phillips 
Curve, the Rational Expectations version experiences Political Interpretative Flexibility. It 
can be constructed as expressive of multiple political agendas. 
 
 
4. UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL INTERPRETATIVE FLEXIBILITY IN THE 
PHILLIPS CURVE DEBATE 
 
This paper has demonstrated the existence of Political Interpretative Flexibility in the 
adaptive and rational expectations augmented Phillips Curves. Both symptoms have been 
illustrated, each incarnation of the Phillips Curve is expressive of multiple political 
ideologies, and macroeconomists with the same political beliefs can consider these beliefs 
best expressed by differing versions of the Phillips Curve. Through comparison of the 
discussions of each form of augmentation it is clear that all right wingers, all left wingers and 
all Marxists have not supported the same Phillips Curve. In many of these cases the 
embodiment of a political ideology in the theory has also been established. 
 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that in the period studied political interests failed 
to provide impetus for opening and closing macroeconomic debates. This is not because 
Phillips Curve theories are apolitical, but because the patterns of linkage between political 
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ideology and macroeconomic concepts were not systematically distributed. Unlike 
Phrenology in 18th Century Edinburgh, shifts in the wider political culture did not impact 
upon consensus in macroeconomics through the social interest dynamic exemplified by 
Shapin (1975, 1979). This is because a wider political shift in any direction will not spur an 
increased public profile or strengthen the research effort of a particular Phillips Curve 
construction. Since the expression of political ideology was diffuse amongst opposed 
macroeconomic positions the increased power associated with shifts in the dominant political 
position was equally dispersed and thus diluted.  
 
Political Interpretative Flexibility implies that as well as being insufficient to cause shifts in 
macroeconomic orthodoxy, political interests are also insufficient to prevent such shifts. 
When a shift between macroeconomic orthodoxies begun the ideological interests were too 
weak a restraint to impede it. This is for two reasons. Firstly, on an individual level, 
macroeconomists who did express their political views through their work were able to 
reconfigure their construction of the political connotations into compliance with their 
acceptance of a new version of the Phillips Curve.  An example of this is Phelps, whose 
position on negative income taxes shifted in such a way that constructed supply side policies 
as expressive of left wing values. The second reason why political interests do not repress 
shifts in orthodoxy under conditions of Political Interpretative Flexibility highlights the role 
of young macroeconomists in shifts of orthodoxy. The new generation of macroeconomists 
were less entrenched in old theories and were more willing to explore new research agendas ( 
Stephens 2005). We can see that if strong systematic linkages between political positions and 
incarnations of the Phillips Curve had existed then the flexibility for young politically 
motivated macroeconomists to adopt the latest position would have been curtailed. This is 
because young right wing macroeconomists would have been more inclined to adopt the 
position systematically constructed as right wing, as with left wingers. The lack of these 
linkages removed further tension and added further lubricant to the cycle of contest and 
closure in the Phillips Curve debates. 
 
The Phillips Curve debates, then, not only exhibited Political Interpretative Flexibility, but 
were also shaped by it. The political connotations of the Phillips Curve relationships were 
contingently assembled, with infinite potential configurations. Political Interpretative 
Flexibility prevented established political interests from constraining shifts in 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. This is not to claim that macroeconomics is a-political, many 
macroeconomists did perceive their work as an explicitly political act, but instead that 
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political connotations were not systematically distributed and did not structure the lines of 
the Phillips Curve debate. 
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